We analyze selected iterated conditionals in the framework of conditional random quantities. We point out that it is instructive to examine Lewis's triviality result, which shows the conditions a conditional must satisfy for its probability to be the conditional probability. In our approach, however, we avoid triviality because the import-export principle is invalid. We then analyze an example of reasoning under partial knowledge where, given a conditional if A then C as information, the probability of A should intuitively increase. In our approach, we explain this intuition by making some implicit background information explicit. We consider several (generalized) iterated conditionals, which allow us to formalize different kinds of latent information. We verify that for these iterated conditionals the prevision is greater than or equal to the probability of A. We also investigate the lower and upper bounds of the Affirmation of the Consequent inference. We conclude our study with some remarks on the supposed "independence" of two conditionals, and we interpret this property as uncorrelation between two random quantities.
Introduction and motivation
"Even the crows on the roofs caw about the nature of conditonals" (Callimachos quoted after [58] , p. 128)
Debates about the nature of conditionals have a very long tradition in philosophy and logic, which go back at least to Diodorus Cronus and his pupil Philo ( [58] ). Even at that early stage, the emerging debate inspired the famous Callimachos epigram. The logical tradition in the study of conditionals has recently led to the popularity of probabilistic approaches. Among the various interpretations of probability (see, e.g., [32] ), we adopt the subjective analysis, which is due to de Finetti ( [22, 23] ) and Ramsey ([84] ). The probabilistic theory of de Finetti, based on the well-known coherence principle, has been studied and extended by many authors (see, e.g., [3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 19, 20, 34, 37, 38, 41, 46, 47, 59, 71, 72] ). We recall that the coherence principle of de Finetti plays a key role in probabilistic reasoning. Indeed, it allows us to extend any coherent assessment, on an arbitrary family of (conditional) events, to further (conditional) events (fundamental theorem of probability). De Finetti and Ramsey have held that the probability of a natural language conditional, Ppif A then Cq, and the conditional subjective probability of C given A, PpC|Aq, are closely related to each other ( [6] ). Identifying these probabilities has such far-reaching consequences that it has simply been called the Equation ( [29] ), but we will refer to it here as the conditional probability hypothesis:
A conditional that satisfies the CPH has been termed a conditional event ( [23] ), and a probability conditional ( [2, 65] ). The CPH is usually adopted in conjunction with the Ramsey test ( [6, 29, 84] ), which states that a probability judgment is made about a conditional, if A then C, by judging the probability of C under the supposition that A holds, resulting in a degree of belief in C given A, the conditional subjective probability PpC|Aq. We will use conditional event for such a conditional, as our work here depends so much on de Finetti. By synthesizing the previous comments, in our approach, a natural language conditional if A then C is looked at as a three-valued logical entity which coincides with the conditional event C|A, formally defined in Section 2.1. Then, CPH appears as a natural consequence.
One of the important implications of the CPH is that the natural language conditional cannot be identified with the material conditional of truth functional logic, which is equivalent to s A_C ("not-A or C", as defined as usual) and which resembles Philo's ancient conception of conditionals. The material conditional is not a conditional event, since Pp s A _ Cq " PpC|Aq only in extreme cases, e.g. when C " A, in which case Pp s A _ Cq " Pp s A _ Aq " 1 " PpA|Aq " PpC|Aq, while in general it holds that PpC|Aq ď Pp s A _ Cq. Some philosophers (see, e.g., [54] ) and psychologists (see, e.g., [56] ) have tried to argue that the natural language conditional is a material conditional at its semantic core, but this cannot be right if the CPH is true (see [39] for a detailed study of the probability of disjunctions and the conditional probability).
There are logical and philosophical arguments, and appeals to intuition, in support of the CPH. Consider the simple indicative conditional:
(SH) If you spin the coin (S ), it will land heads (H).
Suppose we believe that the coin is fair. It would then seem clear that the probability of (SH), Ppif S then Hq, is 0.5, i.e. PpH|S q " .5 for a fair coin. If we suspect the coin is biased, we could spin it a large number of times m and record the number of times n that it came up heads. The ratio n{m would give us direct evidence about PpH|S q for the next spin, and intuitively that would tell us how to judge Ppif S then Hq. We could then make a conditional bet on the next spin, by placing "I bet that" at the beginning of (SH), using PpH|S q as the probability that we will win the bet (assuming that the bet is not called off), thus fixing the rational odds for it. Both [23] and [83] related conditionals to conditional bets, and it is striking that the two founders of contemporary subjective probability theory could have independently developed views of the conditional that were so similar to each other.
Influenced by the above points, psychologists of reasoning have tested the CPH in controlled experiments, and found that people tend to conform to it for a wide range of conditionals, from indicative conditionals ( [31, 35, 73] ) and conditional bets ( [5] ) to counterfactuals and causal conditionals ( [69, 70, 81, 82] ). In the opinion of some authors, the CPH may not hold for conditionals if A then C when the antecedent A does not raise the probability of the conditional's consequent C ( [26, 88] ), but the significance of this finding is open to dispute ( [69] ), and the general support for the CPH has had a major impact in psychology ( [30, 68] ), formal epistemology ( [76] ), and philosophical logic ( [75, 78, 79, 80] ). But what can we say about the semantics and logic of conditionals, under CPH?
Stalnaker used a possible worlds analysis to give the formal semantics and logical properties of a conditional that he claimed satisfied the CPH ( [89, 90] ), which is indeed sometimes termed Stalnaker's hypothesis ( [28] ). Stalnaker's conditional, if A then C, is true in a possible world w x if and only if C is true in the closest possible world w y to w x in which A is true, the closest A world. The closest A world to w x is determined by similarity to w x . Where w y is the closest possible A world to w x , w y will be the most similar A world to w x in facts and scientific laws, with the proviso that A will be true in w y . Every world is most similar to itself, and so when A is true at w x , if A then C is true at w x if and only if A^C is true at w x . The Stalnaker conditional if A then C is also always true or false at a possible world in which A is false, a not-A world. For when A is false at w x , if A then C will be true at w x if and only if A^C is true at the closest A world w y to w x .
For example, suppose there are four possible worlds, A^C, A^s C, s A^C, and s A^s C. Then, if A then C will be true in the A^C world, and false in the A^s C world. We assume that all of these worlds have the probability of .25. Supposing that the A^C world is closer to the s A worlds than the A^s C world, the probability of the Stalnaker conditional if A then C is obtained by the sum of the probabilities over the three worlds, PpA^Cq`Pp s A^Cq`Pp s A^s Cq " .75. This is because the Stalnaker conditional is then true in the three worlds: A^C, s A^C, and s A^s C. Now we note that the conditional probability of C|A is .5. But the probability of the Stalnaker conditional is .75, since it is true in three of the four worlds, and it has their probabilities. If, differently from above, we suppose that the A^s C world is closer to the s A worlds than the A^C world, then the probability of the Stalnaker conditional if A then C is obtained by the probability of one world only, namely PpA^Cq " 0.25. This is because the Stalnaker conditional is now true in just the world: A^C.
The above examples show that the probability of the Stalnaker conditional is in general different from the conditional probability PpC|Aq.
Lewis did more than illustrate this point: he proved a stronger result. Lewis strictly proved that the CPH will not generally be satisfied for a conditional like Stalnaker's, or Lewis's own in [64] . His proof is very instructive in revealing what the semantics of a conditional must be like for it to satisfy the CPH, and so for it to be a conditional event. There are a number of variations of Lewis's proof, and some further proofs have been inspired by it ( [6, 28] ), but we discuss below a version of the proof that best illustrates the properties that a conditional must have to satisfy the CPH and so be a conditional event. Considering the relation between a conditional if A then C and its consequent C, and using the total probability theorem, in [65] it was derived:
Ppif A then Cq " PpCqPppif A then Cq|Cq`Pp s CqPppif A then Cq| s Cq.
Assuming the CPH, Lewis then argued that Pppif A then Cq|Cq should be 1, 2 and Pppif A then Cq| s Cq should be 0, with the result that Ppif A then Cq " PpCq. This is an absurd result. As Lewis put it, Ppif A then Cq can only be PpCq for "trivial" probability functions. He therefore inferred, by reductio ad absurdum, that CPH must be rejected. He justified his claim that, given CPH, Pppif A then Cq|Cq should be 1 by arguing that it should then equal the result of learning C for sure, denoted by P C p. . .q, yielding P C pif A then Cq " P C pC|Aq " 1, and similarly for Pppif A then Cq| s Cq and learning not-C for sure, P s C p. . .q, with P s C pif A then Cq " P s C pC|Aq " 0 following. In an early reply, van Fraassen ( [91] ) cast doubt on Lewis's presupposition that the semantics of a natural language conditional is independent of a person's subjective epistemic state (see also [57] ). The semantics of a Stalnaker conditional is based on a similarity relation between possible worlds, which is a (kind of subjective) qualitative comparison between possible worlds, and this conditional is always objectively true or false, at A worlds and s A worlds, as we saw above. But it has to be different for a conditional event. A conditional event if A then C cannot be objectively true or false in s A worlds. As we will explain below in a more formal analysis, a conditional event C|A is looked at as a three-valued logical entity, with values true, or false, or void (with an associated subjective degree of belief), according to whether C^A is true, or s C^A is true, or s A is true, respectively. Moreover, from a numerical point of view C|A becomes a random quantity (the indicator of C|A) with values: 1, when C|A is true; 0, when C|A is false; PpC|Aq, when C|A is void. Notice that the use of PpC|Aq as numerical representation of the logical value void plays a key role both in theoretical developments and in algorithms (for instance, the betting scheme, the penalty criterion, coherence checking and propagation). Then, (by identifying logical and numerical aspects) the conditional event C|A has the conditional probability, PpC|Aq, as its semantic value in s A cases ( [21, 36, 48, 55, 69, 77] ). This value does, of course, depend on subjective mental states, which concern the uncertainty on C (when A is assumed to be true), and the effect of these on conditional probability judgments. The conditional event does not acquire probability from s A worlds, because it is not objectively true at these worlds. Its value, PpC|Aq, in these worlds is its overall expected value, or prevision in de Finetti's terms, across all the A-worlds (indeed, the value PpC|Aq is the result of a mental process in which A is assumed to be true and C may be true or false across the A-worlds). The value PpC|Aq can be determined in a Ramsey test of if A then C, by using operatively the betting scheme or the penalty criterion of de Finetti.
Another way to justify Lewis's claim about what follows from the CPH is to use what has been called the import-export principle ( [66] ): 2 In logic under the material conditional interpretation, it is easy to see that if C, then (if A then C) is logically true and, by the deduction theorem, the inference of if A then C from C is logically valid. This inference is also known as one of the paradoxes of the material conditional, which is absurd when instantiated by natural language conditionals. For standard approaches to probability, which define the conditional probability PpC|Aq by PpACq{PpAq-where PpAq ą 0 is assumed to avoid a fraction over zero-one obtains PpC|Aq " 1 when PpCq " 1 (provided PpAq ą 0). Thus, in this case, this paradox of the material conditional is inherited by such standard approaches to probability. In the coherence approach, however, this paradox of the material conditional is blocked since even if PpCq " 1, 0 ď PpC|Aq ď 1 (and it is not assumed that PpAq ą 0; for a proof see [74] ).
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(IE) Ppif B then pif A then Cqq " Ppif pA^Bq then Cq.
Using IE and a general form of CPH, one can prove that Pppif A then Cq|Cq should be 1, and Pppif A then Cq| s
Cq should be 0. Indeed, assuming CPH and IE, as Pppif A then Cq|Cq " Ppif C then pif A then Cq, we can infer that Ppif C then pif A then Cqq " Ppif (C^Aq then Cq " PpC|pA^Cqq " 1. Similarly under those assumptions, it follows that Pppif A then Cq| s Cq " 0. It is therefore clear that, to avoid triviality, IE must fail for the conditional event, and in our formal analysis IE is false for this conditional ( [44, 48] ). The expected values, or previsions (denoted by the symbol P), of pif B then pif A then Cqq and pif pA^Bq then Cq can diverge. Indeed, in our approach, it holds that
which in general does not coincide with PpCq because PppC|Aq|Cq ‰ PpC|ACq " 1 and PppC|Aq| s Cq ‰ PpC|A s Cq " 0 (see [48, Theorem 6] ). Thus Lewis's triviality is avoided (see also [92] for an experimental study of Lewis / Stalnaker conditionals and the import-export principle).
Douven and Dietz ( [28] ) aimed to show that there is a serious problem with the CPH without making assumptions about the relation between conditionals and subjective semantic values. Their argument depends on their observation that a conditional that satisfies the CPH will be probabilistically independent of its antecedent:
(IA) PpA|pif A then Cqq " PpAq.
We will examine the validity of (IA) formally for the iterated conditional A|pC|Aq in what follows (see Section 4), and make some points about probabilistic independence and uncorrelation in our approach (see Section 8) . But at this point, we will focus on the instructive argument of Douven and Dietz that (IA) should be rejected for the natural language conditional, implying that CPH is false. Douven and Dietz used an example for their argument, and we will slightly simplify the conditional as follows:
(ES) If Sue passed the exam (A), she will go on a skiing holiday (C).
In the example, Harry sees Sue buying some skiing equipment, and this surprises him because he knows that she recently had an exam, which he believes she is unlikely to have passed, making PpAq low for him. But then Harry meets Tom, who tells him that (ES) is likely. This information increases Ppif A then Cq for Harry, which means that PpC|Aq increases for Harry, assuming that CPH holds. Douven and Dietz argue that it is intuitively right that PpAq should go up for Harry, given this information about (ES), since a high PpAq explains why Sue bought the skiing equipment. But then (IA) cannot be accepted, because it implies that PpAq will be unaffected by conditioning on if A then C. We draw a different conclusion from this useful example.
Among other things we will show that, by replacing the antecedent C|A by pC|Aq^C, we will reach the conclusion that the degree of belief in A|ppC|Aq^Cq is greater than or equal to PpAq. This reasoning is a form of abductive inference ( [27] , see also [24] ), which is related to the classical "fallacy" of Affirmation of the Consequent (AC): from if A then C and C infer A. Under the material conditional interpretation of conditionals, AC is not logically valid. Therefore, it is classically called a fallacy. However, we will compute the lower and upper bounds for the 5 conclusion of AC, showing when AC can be a strong, though not valid, inference for reasoning under partial knowledge. We will expand our analysis by considering iterated conditionals. We will use this analysis to take account of implicit information that can be present in particular contexts. This added information will explain the intuition that the degree of belief in A should sometimes increase given if A then C. We will also make some comments about uncorrelation and probabilistic independence, pointing out in particular that the event A and the conditional if A then C are uncorrelated, but not probabilistically independent, and we will explain why this distinction does not lead to counterintuitive results. The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we recall some basic notions and results on coherence, logical operations among conditional events, and iterated conditionals. In Section 3 we study the antecedent-nested conditional if (C when A), then D. In Section 4 we analyze the particular case where D " A, by studying the antecedent-nested conditional if (C when A), then A and by considering selected related iterated conditionals. In addition, we discuss and apply our results to the above mentioned Harry and Sue example (ES). In Section 5 we consider the generalized iterated conditional A|ppC|Aq^Cq which allows to make some latent information explicit, such that the degree of belief in A increases. In Section 6 we refine the study of the lower and upper bounds for the AC rule. In Section 7 we examine selected further cases where, based on suitable generalized iterated conditionals, the degree of belief in A increases. In Section 8 we discuss and correctly interpret a product formula for the conjunction of two conditionals using the notion of uncorrelation, rather than probabilistic independence, between two random quantities. In Section 9 we give a summary of the paper, by adding some final comments.
Preliminary notions and results
In this section we recall some basic notions and results concerning coherence (see, e.g., [10, 12, 15, 19, 72] ), logical operations among conditional events, and iterated conditionals (see [44, 45, 48, 49, 51, 87] ).
Conditional events and coherent conditional probability assessments
In real world applications, we very often have to manage uncertainty about the facts, which are described by (non-ambiguous) logical propositions. For dealing with unknown facts we use the notion of event. In formal terms, an event A is a two-valued logical entity which can be true, or false. The indicator of A, denoted by the same symbol, is 1, or 0, according to whether A is true, or false. The sure event and the impossible event are denoted by Ω and H, respectively. Given two events A and B, we denote by A^B, or simply by AB, (resp., A _ B) the logical conjunction (resp., the logical disjunction). The negation of A is denoted by s A. We simply write A Ď B to denote that A logically implies B, that is A s B " H. We recall that n events A 1 , . . . , A n are logically independent when the number m of constituents, or possible worlds, generated by them is 2 n (in general m ď 2 n ).
Given two events A, H, with H ‰ H, the conditional event A|H is defined as a three-valued logical entity which is true, or false, or void, according to whether AH is true, or s AH is true, or s H is true, respectively. The notion of logical inclusion among events has been generalized to conditional events by Goodman and Nguyen in [53] (see also [47] for some related results). Given two conditional events A|H and B|K, we say that A|H implies B|K, denoted by A|H Ď B|K, iff AH true implies BK true and s BK true implies s AH true; i.e., iff AH Ď BK and s BK Ď s AH. In the subjective approach to probability based on the betting scheme, to assess PpA|Hq " x means that, for every real number s, you are willing to pay (resp., to receive) an amount sx and to receive (resp., to pay) s, or 0, or sx, according to whether AH is true, or s AH is true, or s H is true (bet called off), respectively. The random gain, which is the difference between the (random) amount that you receive and the amount that you pay, is
In what follows, we assume that the probabilistic assessments are coherent (see Definition 2) . In particular, the coherence of any assessment
In numerical terms, once x " PpA|Hq is assessed by the betting scheme, the indicator of A|H, denoted by the same symbol, is defined as 1, or 0, or x, according to whether AH is true, or s AH is true, or s H is true. Then, by setting PpA|Hq " x,
and when you pay sx the amount that you receive is s A|H " spAH`x s Hq, with a random gain given by G " sHpA´xq " spA|H´xq. In particular, when s " 1, you pay x and receive A|H. Notice that, when H Ď A (i.e., AH " H), by coherence PpA|Hq " 1 and hence A|H " H`s H " 1. The negation of a conditional event A|H is defined by s A|H, which coincides with 1´A|H.
Remark 1. We point out that the definition of (the indicator of) A|H is not circular because by the betting scheme the three-valued numerical entity A|H is defined once the value x " PpA|Hq is assessed. We recall that a systematic study concerning the third value of a conditional event has been developed in [17] , where it has been shown that it satisfies all the properties of a conditional probability. In addition, an extension in the setting of possibility theory and to general measures of uncertainty has been given in [13, 18] . The semantics of our approach is probabilistic; then, by the betting scheme, the third value for the indicator of A|H is PpA|Hq. Notice that, given two conditional events A|H and B|K, for their indicators it makes sense to check the inequality A|H ď B|K. For instance, the inequality holds when the conditional events satisfy the Goodman and Nguyen relation, i.e. A|H Ď B|K. Indeed, in this case coherence requires that PpA|Hq ď PpB|Kq and hence A|H ď B|K (see also [47, Theorem 6] ).
Given a probability function P defined on an arbitrary family K of conditional events, consider a finite subfamily F " tE 1 |H 1 , . . . , E n |H n u Ď K and the vector P " pp 1 , . . . , p n q, where p i " PpE i |H i q is the assessed probability for the conditional event E i |H i , i P t1, . . . , nu. With the pair pF , Pq we associate the random gain G "
We denote by G H n the set of values of G restricted to H n " H 1 _¨¨¨_ H n , i.e., the set of values of G when H n is true. Then, we recall below the notion of coherence in the context of the betting scheme. Definition 1. The function P defined on K is coherent if and only if, @n ě 1, @ s 1 , . . . , s n , @ F " tE 1 |H 1 , . . . , E n |H n u Ď K, it holds that: min G H n ď 0 ď max G H n .
As shown by Definition1, the function P is coherent if and only if, in any finite combination of n bets, it cannot happen that the values in the set G H n are all positive, or all negative (no Dutch Book).
Conditional random quantities and coherent conditional prevision assessments
More in general, if A is replaced by a random quantity X, denoting by P the symbol of prevision, to assess PpX|Hq " µ means that, for every real number s, you are willing to pay an amount sµ and to receive sX, or sµ, according to whether H is true, or s H is true (the bet is called off), respectively. Of course, when X is an event A, it holds that PpX|Hq " PpA|Hq. The random gain is G " spX`µ s Hq´sµ " sHpX´µq. By following the approach given in [17, 40, 44, 45, 48, 59] , once specified a coherent assessment µ " PpX|Hq, the conditional random quantity X|H is defined as X, or µ, according to whether H is true, or s H is true. Then, X|H " XH`µ s H and the random gain associated with a bet on X|H is G " sHpX´µq " spX|H´µq, that is G is the difference between what you receive, sX|H, and what you pay, sµ. Denoting by X H " tx 1 , . . . , x r u the set of possible values of X restricted to H and by setting A j " pX " x j q, j " 1, . . . , r, it holds that
In what follows, for any given conditional random quantity X|H, we assume that, when H is true, the set of possible values of X is finite. In this case we say that X|H is a finite conditional random quantity. Given a prevision function P defined on an arbitrary family K of finite conditional random quantities, consider a finite subfamily F " tX 1 |H 1 , . . . , X n |H n u Ď K and the vector M " pµ 1 , . . . , µ n q, where µ i " PpX i |H i q is the assessed prevision for the conditional random quantity X i |H i , i P t1, . . . , nu. With the pair pF , Mq we associate the random gain G " ř n i"1 s i H i pX i´µi q " ř n i"1 s i pX i |H i´µi q. We denote by G H n the set of values of G restricted to H n " H 1 _¨¨¨_ H n . Then, the notion of coherence is defined as below.
Definition 2. The function P defined on K is coherent if and only if, @n ě 1, @ s 1 , . . . , s n , @ F " tX 1 |H 1 , . . . , X n |H n u Ď K, it holds that: min G H n ď 0 ď max G H n .
In particular, by Definition 2, the coherence of a prevision assessment PpX|Hq " µ is equivalent to min X H ď µ ď max X H , where we recall that X H is the set of valued of X when H is true.
Given a family F " tX 1 |H 1 , . . . , X n |H n u, for each i P t1, . . . , nu we denote by tx i1 , . . . , x ir i u the set of possible values of X i when H i is true; then, we set A i j " pX i " x i j q, i " 1, . . . , n, j " 1, . . . , r i . We set C 0 " s H 1¨¨¨s H n (it may be C 0 " H) and we denote by C 1 , . . . , C m the constituents contained in H n " H 1 _¨¨¨_ H n . Hence
. . , µ n q. Denoting by I the convex hull of Q 1 , . . . , Q m , the condition M P I amounts to the existence of a vector pλ 1 , . . . , λ m q such that:
in other words, M P I is equivalent to the solvability of the system pΣq, associated with pF , Mq,
Given the assessment M " pµ 1 , . . . , µ n q on F " tX 1 |H 1 , . . . , X n |H n u, let S be the set of solutions Λ " pλ 1 , . . . , λ m q of system pΣq. We point out that the solvability of system pΣq is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for coherence of M on F . When pΣq is solvable, that is S ‰ H, we define:
For what concerns the probabilistic meaning of I 0 , it holds that i P I 0 if and only if the (unique) coherent extension of M to H i |H n is zero. Then, the following theorem can be proved ([11, Theorem 3]):
Theorem 1 (Operative characterization of coherence). A conditional prevision assessment M " pµ 1 , . . . , µ n q on the family F " tX 1 |H 1 , . . . , X n |H n u is coherent if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
Coherence can be characterized in terms of proper scoring rules ( [12, 43] ), which can be related to the notion of entropy in information theory ( [60, 61, 62, 63] ). The result below ( [48, Theorem 4] ) shows that if two conditional random quantities X|H, Y|K coincide when H _ K is true, then X|H and Y|K also coincide when H _ K is false, and hence X|H coincides with Y|K in all cases.
Theorem 2. Given any events H ‰ H and K ‰ H, and any random quantities X and Y, let Π be the set of the coherent prevision assessments PpX|Hq " µ and PpY|Kq " ν. piq Assume that, for every pµ, νq P Π, X|H " Y|K when H _ K is true; then µ " ν for every pµ, νq P Π. piiq For every pµ, νq P Π, X|H " Y|K when H _ K is true if and only if X|H " Y|K. Remark 2. Theorem 2 has been generalized in [51, Theorem 6] by replacing the symbol """ by "ď" in statements piq and piiq. In other words, if X|H ď Y|K when H _ K is true, then PpX|Hq ď PpY|Kq and hence X|H ď Y|K in all cases.
Conjoined and iterated conditionals
We recall now the notions of conjoined (e.g., pif H then Aq and pif K then Bq), disjoined (e.g., pif H then Aq or pif K then Bq), and iterated conditionals (e.g., if pif H then Aq, then pif K then Bq), which were introduced in the framework of conditional random quantities ( [44, 45, 48] ). Definition 3. Given any pair of conditional events A|H and B|K, with PpA|Hq " x and PpB|Kq " y, their conjunction pA|Hq^pB|Kq is the conditional random quantity defined as
where z " PrpA|Hq^pB|Kqs " PrpAHBK`x s HBK`y s KAHq|pH _ Kqs.
In betting terms z represents the amount you agree to pay, with the proviso that you will receive the quantity
which assumes one of the following values:
• 1, if both conditional events are true;
• 0, if at least one of the conditional events is false;
• the probability of the conditional event that is void, if one conditional event is void and the other one is true;
• z (the amount that you payed), if both conditional events are void.
The result below shows that Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds still hold for the conjunction of two conditional events ([48, Theorem 7]). 
We observe that, by logical independence, the assessment px, yq on tA|H, B|Ku is coherent for every px, yq P r0, 1s 2 . Moreover, the main aspect in the proof of Theorem 3 shows that the assessment px, y, zq is coherent if and only if it belongs to the tetrahedron with vertices the points p1, 1, 1q, p1, 0, 0q, p0, 1, 0q, p0, 0, 0q.
Remark 3. Notice that, the assumption of logical independence plays a key role for the validity of Theorem 3. Indeed, in case of some logical dependencies, for the interval rz 1 , z 2 s of coherent extensions z, it holds that maxtx`y´1, 0u ď z 1 ď z 2 ď mintx, yu. For instance, when H " K and AB " H, the coherence of the assessment px, yq on tA|H, B|Hu is equivalent to the condition x`y´1 ď 0. In this case, it holds that pA|Hq^pB|Hq " AB|H with PpAB|Hq " 0; then, the unique coherent extension on AB|H is z " 0. As another example, in the case A " B, with A, H, K assumed to be logically independent, it holds that the assessment px, yq on tA|H, A|Ku is coherent for every px, yq P r0, 1s 2 . Moreover, the extension z is coherent if and only if xy ď z ď mintx, yu (see [50, Theorem 5] ). Finally, we remark that in all cases, for each coherent extension z it holds that z P rz 1 , z 2 s Ď r0, 1s; thus pA|Hq^pB|Kq P r0, 1s.
Other approaches to compounded conditionals, which are not based on coherence, can be found in [57, 67] (see also [14, 33] ). A study of the lower and upper bounds for other definitions of conjunction, where the conjunction is a conditional event like Adams' quasi conjunction, has been given [85] . Based on the structure of (1), i.e. l| " l^ `Ppl| q s , which we use with l " B|K and " A|H, the notion of iterated conditional pB|Kq|pA|Hq is defined as follows (see, e.g., [44, 45, 48] ): 10 Definition 4. Given any pair of conditional events A|H and B|K, with AH ‰ H, let px, y, zq be a coherent assessment on tA|H, B|K, pA|Hq^pB|Kqu. The iterated conditional pB|Kq|pA|Hq is defined as the conditional random quantity pB|Kq|pA|Hq " pB|Kq^pA|Hq`µ s A|H "
where µ " PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs.
Within betting scheme, to assess PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs " µ means in particular that you are willing to pay the amount µ, with the proviso that you will receive the quantity pA|Hq^pB|Kq`µ s A|H. Of course, as specified in Definition 4, this bet requires that you preliminarily evaluate (in a coherent way) the quantities: x " PpA|Hq, y " PpB|Kq, and z " PrpA|Hq^pB|Kqs. Notice that, when H " K " Ω, the iterated conditional pB|Ωq|pA|Ωq becomes the conditional event B|A.
Definition 4 allows us to represent antecedent-nested and consequent-nested conditionals. These are, respectively, conditionals with other conditionals as antecedents, and conditionals with other conditionals as consequents. As an example of a natural language instantiation of such a conditional consider the following:
"If the match is canceled if it starts raining, then the match is canceled if it starts snowing" (p. 45 of [26] ).
Remark 4. Notice that we assume AH ‰ H to give a nontrivial meaning to the notion of the iterated conditional. Indeed, if AH were equal to H (and of course H ‰ H), that is A|H " 0, then it would be the case that s A|H " 1 and pB|Kq|pA|Hq " pB|Kq|0 " pB|Kq^pA|Hq`µ s A|H " µ would follow; that is, pB|Kq|pA|Hq would coincide with the (indeterminate) value µ. Similarly in the case of B|H (which is of no interest). Thus the trivial iterated conditional pB|Kq|0 is not considered in our approach. In betting terms, both situations mean that you get your money back because these bets are always called-off.
We observe that, by the linearity of prevision, it holds that
Here, when x ą 0, we obtain µ " z x P r0, 1s. Based on the equality µ " z`µp1´xq, formula (8) can be written as pB|Kq|pA|Hq "
In particular, when x " 0, it holds that pB|Kq|pA|Hq "
As we can see, in order that the prevision assessment µ on pB|Kq|pA|Hq be coherent, µ must belong to the convex hull of the values 0, y, 1; that is, (also when x " 0) it must be that µ P r0, 1s. Then, pB|Kq|pA|Hq P r0, 1s. In general, in [87, Theorem 3] it has been given the following result:
Theorem 4. Let A, B, H, K be any logically independent events. The set Π of all coherent assessments px, y, z, µq on the family F " tA|H, B|K, pA|Hq^pB|Kq, pB|Kq|pA|Hqu is Π " Π 1 Y Π 2 , where Π 1 " tpx, y, z, µq : x P p0, 1s, y P r0, 1s, z P rz 1 , z 2 s, µ " z x u, with z 1 " maxtx`y´1, 0u, z 2 " mintx, yu, and Π 2 " tp0, y, 0, µq : py, µq P r0, 1s 2 u.
(11)
Remark 5. We note that the iterated conditional pB|Kq|A is (not a conditional event but) a conditional random quantity. Moreover, pB|Kq|A does not coincide with the conditional event B|AK (see [48, Section 3.3] ). Thus the import-export principle ( [67] ), which says that pB|Kq|A " B|AK, does not hold (as, e.g., in [1, 57] ). Therefore, as shown in [48] , we avoid the counter-intuitive consequences related to the well-known Lewis' first triviality result ( [65] ). Remark 6. As a further comment on the import-export principle, we observe that given any random quantity X and any events H, K, with H ‰ H, K ‰ H, it holds that (see [44, Proposition 1]): pX|Kq|H " pX|Hq|K " X|HK, when H Ď K or K Ď H. Of course, X|HK coincides with X|H, or X|K, according to whether H Ď K, or K Ď H, respectively. In particular, when X is an event A, it holds that pA|Kq|H " pA|Hq|K " A|HK. Then, given any two events H, K, with K ‰ H, as K Ď H _ K, it holds that: pX|Kq|pH _ Kq " X|K.
We recall the notion of conjunction of n conditional events ( [51] ).
Definition 5. Let n conditional events E 1 |H 1 , . . . , E n |H n be given. For each non-empty subset S of t1, . . . , nu, let x S be a prevision assessment on Ź iPS pE i |H i q. Then, the conjunction C 1¨¨¨n " pE 1 |H 1 q^¨¨¨^pE n |H n q is defined as
In the betting framework, you agree to pay PpC 1¨¨¨n q with the proviso that you will receive:
• 1, if all conditional events are true;
• the prevision of the conjunction of those conditional events which are void, otherwise.
The operation of conjunction is associative and commutative. In addition, the following monotonicity property holds ([51, Theorem 7])
We recall the following generalized notion of iterated conditional ([51, Definition 14] ). Definition 6. Let n`1 conditional events E 1 |H 1 , . . . , E n`1 |H n`1 , with pE 1 |H 1 q^¨¨¨^pE n |H n q ‰ 0, be given. We denote by pE n`1 |H n`1 q|ppE 1 |H 1 q^¨¨¨^pE n |H nthe following random quantity
where µ " PrpE n`1 |H n`1 q|ppE 1 |H 1 q^¨¨¨^pE n |H n qqs.
Definition 6 extends the notion of the iterated conditional pE 2 |H 2 q|pE 1 |H 1 q given in Definition 4 to the case where the antecedent is a conjunction of conditional events. Based on the betting metaphor, the quantity µ is the amount to be paid in order to receive the amount C n`1`µ p1´C n q, where C n`1 " pE 1 |H 1 q^¨¨¨^pE n`1 |H n`1 q and C n " pE 1 |H 1 q^¨¨¨^pE n |H n q. We observe that, defining PpC n q " z n and PpC n`1 q " z n`1 , by the linearity of prevision it holds that µ " z n`1`µ p1´z n q; then, z n`1 " µz n , that is PpC n`1 q " PrpE n`1 |H n`1 q|C n sPpC n q,
which is the compound prevision theorem for the generalized iterated conditionals.
The iterated conditional D|pC|Aq
In this section we analyze the iterated conditional D|pC|Aq (see, e.g., [25, 57] ) which is a more general version of the iterated conditional of interest A|pC|Aq that will be studied in Section 4. We examine the object D|pC|Aq in the framework of the betting scheme. Given any real number x P r0, 1s, we denote by px ą 0q the event which is true or false, according to whether x is positive or zero, respectively. By the symbol px ą 0qE we denote the conjunction between px ą 0q and any event E. Then, the event AC _ px ą 0q s A coincides with AC _ s A, or AC, according to whether x is positive or zero, respectively. The next result shows that D|pC|Aq is a conditional random quantity, where the (dynamic) conditioning event is AC _ px ą 0q s A.
Theorem 5. Let a coherent assessment px, µq on tC|A, D|pC|Aqu be given. The iterated conditional D|pC|Aq is the conditional random quantity
Proof. Let us consider a bet on D|pC|Aq, with A ‰ H, C ‰ H, PpC|Aq " x, and PrD|pC|Aqs " µ.
In this bet, µ is the amount that you agree to pay, while D|pC|Aq is the amount that you receive.
We observe that the bet on D|pC|Aq must be called off in all cases where the random gain G " D|pC|Aq´PrD|pC|Aqs " D|pC|Aq´µ coincides with zero, whatever be the assessed value µ. In other words, the bet must be called off in all cases where the amount D|pC|Aq that you receive coincides with the quantity that you payed µ, whatever be the assessed value µ. By applying (10) to the iterated conditional pD|Ωq|pC|Aq " D|pC|Aq, we obtain
We distinguish three cases: piq x " 0; piiq 0 ă x ă 1; piiiq x " 1. We show that in case piq the bet is called off when s A _ s C is true; in cases piiq and piiiq the bet is called off when s AC is true. Case piq. As x " 0, formula (16) becomes
By setting t " PpD|ACq it holds that
Then, based on Theorem 2, from (17) and (18) it follows that µ " t and hence
That is, the two objects D|pC|Aq and D|AC coincide when x " 0. Here, the bet on D|pC|Aq is called off when Ď AC " s A _ s C is true. 14 Case piiq. As 0 ă x ă 1, from (16) the equality D|pC|Aq " µ holds for every µ only when A s C is true. This means that the bet on D|pC|Aq is called off when A s C is true. Then the conditioning event is Ě
Case piiiq. As x " 1, the iterated conditional D|pC|Aq coincides with the conditional event D|pAC _ s Aq. Indeed, in this case formula (16) becomes
In addition, by setting ν " PpD|pAC _ s Aqq it holds that,
Then, based on Theorem 2, from (21) and (22) it follows that µ " ν and hence
We remark that (23) also follows by observing that when x " 1 it holds that C|A " AC`x s A " AC`s A " AC _ A. Then, we directly obtain D|pC|Aq " D|pAC _ s Aq. Finally, by unifying (19) , (20) , and (23), we obtain D|pC|Aq " rACD`px`µp1´xqq s AD`µp1´xq s A s Ds|rAC _ px ą 0q s As.
Remark 7. As shown in Theorem 5, in general D|pC|Aq ‰ D|AC; that is, the import-export principle is invalid also for antecedent-nested conditionals 3 . Indeed, D|pC|Aq " D|AC only when x " 0 (in this special case the import-export principle holds) and D|pC|Aq " D|pAC _ s Aq only when x " 1. In addition, AC Ď C|A Ď AC _ s A (logical inclusion among conditional events), which in numerical terms implies AC ď C|A ď AC _ s A. However, there are no order relations among the three objects D|AC, D|pC|Aq, and D|pAC _ s Aq (see Table 1 ). Theorem 6. Let A, C, D be three events, with AC ‰ H. Then, s D|pC|Aq " 1´D|pC|Aq. Proof. We distinguish two cases: case piq x ą 0 and case piiq x " 0. Case piq. We set PpC|Aq " x, PrD^pC|Aqs " z, and PrD|pC|Aqs " µ. Then, we recall that by the linearity of prevision PrD|pC|Aqs " PrD^pC|Aqs`µPr1´C|As, that is z " µx. By setting Pr s D|pC|Aqs " η and by applying (10) 
By the linearity of prevision it holds that Pr s D|pC|Aqs " PpC|Aq´PrD^pC|Aqs`ηPr1´C|As, that is η " x´z`ηp1´xq, shortly: z " x´ηx. From z " µx and z " x´ηx it follows that µx " x´ηx, that is x " pµ`ηqx. Then, as x ą 0, it follows that η " 1´µ. In Table 2 we show that D|pC|Aq`s D|pC|Aq is constant and coincides with 1 in all possible cases.
Constituent
D|pC|Aq Case piiq. As x " 0, from Theorem 5 (see equation (19)), it holds that D|pC|Aq " D|AC. Likewise, it holds that s D|pC|Aq " s D|AC. Therefore, D|pC|Aq`s D|pC|Aq " D|AC`s D|AC " Ω|AC " 1.
We observe that in case of some logical dependencies among the events A, C, D some constituents may become impossible, in which case some lines in Table 2 disappear; but, of course, Theorem 6 still holds.
Notice that, based on Theorem 6, a natural notion of negation for D|pC|Aq is given by s D|pC|Aq, which corresponds to the narrow-scope negation of conditionals. We recall that also the (nonnested) conditional is traditionally negated by the narrow-scope negation of conditionals, i.e., the negation of C|A is defined by s C|A " 1´C|A (see Section 2.1).
The iterated conditional A|pC|Aq
In this section we focus the analysis on the iterated conditional A|pC|Aq, which is a special case of D|pC|Aq when D " A. After describing A|pC|Aq as a conditional random quantity (with a dynamic conditioning event), we obtain the equality PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq, under the assumption PpC|Aq ą 0. We also illustrate an urn experiment where such equality is natural. Then, we study some relations among A|AC, A|pC|Aq, and A|pAC _ s Aq by showing in particular that A|pAC _ s Aq ď A|pC|Aq ď A|AC. In addition, we give further results related with the equality PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq and then we consider the Sue example.
The iterated conditional A|pC|Aq and its prevision
We recall that A^pC|Aq " AC, indeed
A^pC|Aq "
By setting µ " PrA|pC|Aqs and x " PpC|Aq, from (10) and (25) we obtain
Then, by applying Theorem 5 with D " A, we obtain Corollary 1. Let a coherent assessment px, µq on tC|A, A|pC|Aqu be given. The iterated conditional A|pC|Aq is the conditional random quantity
We observe that A|AC " 1 because PpA|ACq " 1. The possible values of A|AC, A|pC|Aq, and A|pAC _ s Aq are given in Table 3 . The next result shows that PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq, when PpC|Aq ą 0.
Theorem 7. Let A and C be two events with AC ‰ H. If PpC|Aq ą 0, then PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq. Aqs, and µ " PrA|pC|Aqs. The iterated conditional A|pC|Aq coincides with A|AC " 1 when x " 0, and it coincides with A|pAC _ s
Aq when x " 1.
Proof. By applying equation (9), with pB|Kq|pA|Hq " A|pC|Aq, it holds that
PrA^pC|Aqs " PrA|pC|AqsPpC|Aq.
Moreover, A^pC|Aq " AC and hence
PrA^pC|Aqs " PpACq " PpAqPpC|Aq.
Thus, from (28) and (29), it follows that
from which it follows PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq, when PpC|Aq ą 0.
Notice that the two objects A|pC|Aq and A are generally not equivalent (even if PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq when PpC|Aq ą 0) 4 . Indeed, A is an event, while as shown in (27) the iterated conditional A|pC|Aq is in general a conditional random quantity. We also observe that, when PpC|Aq " 0, formula (30) becomes 0 " 0, but in general PrA|pC|Aqs ‰ PpAq because from (27) one has PrA|pC|Aqs " 1 and usually PpAq ă 1. Thus, when PpC|Aq " 0, the equality PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq holds only if PpAq " 1. We also observe that the assessment py, µq on tA, A|pC|Aqu is coherent for every py, µq P r0, 1s 2 , while y " µ under the constraint PpC|Aq ą 0.
Remark 8. The equality PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq, when PpC|Aq ą 0, appears natural in many examples. Recall, for instance, the experiment where a ball is drawn from an urn of unknown composition. If we consider the events A " "the urn contains 9 white balls and 1 black ball", C " "the (drawn) ball is white", normally we evaluate PpC|Aq " 0.9. Moreover, the degree of belief in the hypothesis A seems to be completely "uncorrelated" with the conditional if A then C. Then, the equality PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq is reasonable, whatever value we specify for PpAq. The same happens if, for instance, A " "the urn contains 2 white balls and 8 black balls", in which case PpC|Aq " 0.2. We notice that on the one hand, even if the equality PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq may appear sometimes counterintuitive, it is a result of our theory, where the new objects of conjoined and iterated conditionals are introduced. On the other hand, we do not see any motivations why the conditional if A then C should modify the degree of belief in A. We will examine later (see Section 5 and Section 7) some examples, where A|pC|Aq is replaced by a suitable generalized iterated conditional (which makes explicit some latent information); then, as a consequence, the previous equality will be replaced by an inequality. For instance, in Section 5, the latent information will be made explicit by replacing A|pC|Aq by A|ppC|Aq^Cq; then, it will be shown that PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs ě PpAq.
Some relations among A|AC, A|pC|Aq, and A|pAC _ s
Aq In this subsection we examine an order relation among A|AC, A|pC|Aq and A|pAC _ s Aq.
Theorem 8. Let A and C be two events, with AC ‰ H. Then, the following order relation holds
Proof. We set PpC|Aq " x, PpA|pAC _ s Aqq " ν, and PpA|pC|Aqq " µ. We distinguish three cases: piq x " 0; piiq 0 ă x ă 1; piiiq x " 1. Case piq. As x " 0, from (27) A|pC|Aq " A|AC " 1. Then, the inequalities in (31) are satisfied. Case piiq. As 0 ă x ă 1, from (27) it holds that A|pC|Aq " rAC`µp1´xq s As|pAC _ s Aq. Then, by observing that A|pAC _ s Aq " AC|pAC _ s Aq and that µp1´xq s A ě 0, it follows
Then, the inequalities in (31) are satisfied. Case piiiq. As x " 1, from (27) it holds that A|pC|Aq " A|pAC _ s Aq. Then, the inequalities in (31) are satisfied.
We remark that from (31) it follows that PrA|pAC _ s Aqs ď PrA|pC|Aqs ď PpA|ACq " 1.
Remark 9. We recall that AC ď C|A ď AC _ s A. Then, symmetrically (see Theorem 8) , it holds that A|AC ě A|pC|Aq ě A|pAC _ s Aq.
In other words, the iterated conditional A|pC|Aq is an intermediate object between A|AC (which is obtained when in the iterated conditional we replace the antecedent C|A by AC) and A|pAC _ s Aq (which is obtained when we replace C|A by the associated material conditional AC _ s A).
In the next result we illustrate the relation among PpC|Aq, PrA|pAC _ s Aqs, and PrA|pC|Aqs.
Theorem 9. Let A and C be two events, with AC ‰ H. We set PpC|Aq " x, PrA|pAC _ s Aqs " ν, and PrA|pC|Aqs " µ. Then, µ " ν`µp1´xqp1´νq.
Proof. We distinguish three cases: piq x " 0; piiq 0 ă x ă 1; piiiq x " 1. Case piq. As x " 0, formula (34) becomes µ " ν`µp1´νq, which is satisfied because from (27) A|pC|Aq " A|AC " 1 and hence µ " 1. Case piiq. As 0 ă x ă 1, from (27) it holds that A|pC|Aq " rAC`µp1´xq s As|pAC _ s Aq. Then, as AC|pAC _ s
Aq " A|pAC _ s Aq, it follows that
Then,
that is (34). Case piiiq. As x " 1, formula (34) becomes µ " ν, which is satisfied because from (27) A|pC|Aq " A|pAC _ s Aq. 
On the Sue example
We will now consider the Sue example, where the events A and C are defined as follows: A "Sue passes the exam, C "Sue goes on a skiing holiday, C|A "If Sue passes the exam, then she goes on a skiing holiday. We recall that, by Corollary 1, when PpC|Aq " 0 it holds that A|pC|Aq " A|AC " 1 and hence
with PrA|pC|Aqs ą PpAq when PpAq ă 1. On the contrary, when PpC|Aq ą 0, by Theorem 7 it follows that PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq, i.e., the degree of belief in Sue passes the exam, given that if Sue passes the exam, then she goes on a skiing holiday coincides with the probability that Sue passes the exam. The equality PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq, in the Sue example, may seem counterintuitive (see the criticism in [28] ); but, in our opinion this happens because some latent information is not considered. In what follows we will examine further iterated conditionals, where the antecedent pC|Aq is replaced by a suitable conjunction containing the additional information that was latent in the context of the Sue example. The new antecedent, with the extra information, explains the intuition that the degree of belief in A (given the new antecedent) should increase. A first relevant case is obtained if we replace the antecedent C|A by pC|Aq^C, that is if we consider the iterated conditional (Sue passes the exam), given that (if Sue passes the exam, then she goes on a skiing holiday) and (she goes on a skiing holiday). In other words we consider the generalized iterated conditional A|ppC|Aq^Cq, which is examined in the next section.
The generalized iterated conditional A|ppC|Aq^Cq
In this section we consider the generalized iterated conditional A|ppC|Aq^Cq. The next result shows that PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs ě PpAq.
Theorem 11. Given two events A and C, with AC ‰ H, it holds that PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs ě PpAq.
Proof. We set x " PpC|Aq and µ " PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs. As A^pC|Aq^C " AC, from Definition 6 it holds that
Then, by the linearity of prevision, it follows that µPrppC|Aq^Cqs " PpACq. We observe that pC|Aq^C "
with PrpC|Aq^Cs ą 0 ðñ PpC|Aq ą 0 and PpA _ Cq ą 0.
If PrpC|Aq^Cs ą 0, then
because PpA _ Cq ď 1. Equivalently, the inequality in (37) also follows because A Ď A|pA _ Cq. If PrpC|Aq^Cs " 0 we distinguish two cases: piq PpC|Aq " 0; piiqPpA _ Cq " 0. In case piq, from (36) we obtain
Then, by coherence, µ " 1 and A|ppC|Aq^Cq " A|AC " 1. Thus µ " 1 ě PpAq.
In case piiq it holds that PpAq " 0 and hence µ ě PpAq.
In conclusion, PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs ě PpAq.
Remark 13. We observe that usually the inequality PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs ě PpAq is strict, with the equality satisfied only in extreme cases. Indeed, as shown in the proof of Theorem 11, when PrpC|Aq^Cs ą 0, we obtain that PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs " PpAq only if PpA _ Cq " 1, or PpAq " 0. When PrpC|Aq^Cs " 0, we obtain that PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs " PpAq only if PpC|Aq " 0 and PpAq " 1, or PpA _ Cq " 0 and PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs " 0.
Theorem 11 can be used to explicate the intuition in the example of Sue ( [28] ), discussed in Section 4.4. The original intuition was that learning the conditional if A then C should increase your degree of belief in A. However, in this example, we learn if A then C and we have the latent information C; then, we believe both the conditional if A then C and the event C. Theorem 11 shows that having these two beliefs can increase our belief in A. In formal terms, if we replace the antecedent C|A by pC|Aq^C, we reach the conclusion that the degree of belief in A|ppC|Aq^Cq is greater than or equal to PpAq. Such reasoning can be seen as a form of an abductive inference (see, e.g., [27] ) and it is also an instance of Affirmation of the Consequent (AC): from if A then C and C infer A. This argument form is not logically valid. In probability logic, however, it is probabilistically informative and not p-valid (see Section 6) .
The next result is similar to Theorem 11, with PpAq replaced by PpA|Cq. 22
Theorem 12. Given two events A and C, with AC ‰ H, it holds that PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs ě PpA|Cq.
Proof. We distinguish three cases: piq PpC|AqPpA _ Cq ą 0; piiq PpC|Aq " 0; piiiq PpC|Aq ą 0 and PpA _ Cq " 0. In case piq, as shown in the proof of Theorem 11, it holds that PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs " PpA|pA_Cqq ě PpA|Cq, because A|C Ď A|pA _ Cq. In case piiq, as shown in the proof of Theorem 11, it holds that A|ppC|Aq^Cq " A|AC " 1 and hence PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs " 1 ě PpA|Cq.
In case piiiq, as we obtain:
and A|ppC|Aq^Cq "
where x " PpC|Aq ą 0. Then, A|C ď A|ppC|Aq^Cq when C is true and by (Theorem 2 and) Remark 2 it follows that PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs ě PpA|Cq.
As shown by Theorem 12, in the Sue example the probability of the conditional A|C, that is (Sue passes the exam), given that (Sue goes on a skiing holiday), can increase if we replace the antecedent C by pC|Aq^C, that is if we replace (Sue goes on a skiing holiday) by (if Sue passes the exam, then she goes on a skiing holiday) and (Sue goes on a skiing holiday).
Remark 14. We observe that, in the particular case where PpC|Aq " 1, it holds that
Then, A|ppC|Aq^Cq coincides with A|C, when C is true and, by Theorem 2, it follows that PpA|ppC|Aq^Cqq " PpA|Cq and A|ppC|Aq^Cq " A|C.
Lower and Upper Bounds on Affirmation of the Consequent
In the previous section we considered an instance of AC in Theorem 11 and the Sue example. In this section we will give a general probabilistic analysis of AC as an inference rule, where the premise set is tC, C|Au and the conclusion is A. We recall that a family of conditional events F " tE i |H i , i " 1, . . . , nu is p-consistent if and only if the assessment p1, 1, . . . , 1q on F is coherent. In addition, a p-consistent family F p-entails a conditional event E|H if and only if the unique coherent extension on E|H of the assessment p1, 1, . . . , 1q on F is PpE|Hq " 1 (see, e.g., [46] ). We say that the inference from F to E|H is p-valid if and only if F p-entails E|H. The characterization of the p-entailment using the notions of conjunction and generalized iterated conditional has been given in [42, 51] . We will show that the inference AC is not p-valid, that is from PpCq " PpC|Aq " 1 it does not follow that PpAq " 1. Notice that this inference rule has been also examined in [77] . Here we examine the inference rule without assuming that 0 ă PpC|Aq ă 1.
Theorem 13. Let two logically independent events A and C and any coherent probability assessment px, yq on tC, C|Au be given. The extension z " PpAq is coherent if and only if z 1 ď z ď z 2 , where
Proof. The constituents are AC, A s C, s AC, s A s C; the associated points for the family tC, C|A, Au are Q 1 " p1, 1, 1q, Q 2 " p0, 0, 1q, Q 3 " p1, y, 0q, Q 4 " p0, y, 0q. We denote by I the convex hull of Q 1 , . . . , Q 4 . We observe that: the assessment px, yq on tC, C|Au is coherent, for every px, yq P r0, 1s 2 ; the assessment px, zq on tC, Au is coherent, for every px, zq P r0, 1s 2 ; the assessment py, zq on tC|A, Au is coherent, for every py, zq P r0, 1s 2 . Then, the coherence of px, y, zq is equivalent to the condition px, y, zq P I, that is to the solvability of the system
We observe that the system p40q with z " 0 is solvable for every px, yq P r0, 1s 2 . Then, z 1 " 0 for every px, yq P r0, 1s 2 . Concerning the upper bound z 2 we distinguish three cases: piq x " y; piiq x ă y; piiiq x ą y. Case piq. Given any px, yq, with x " y P r0, 1s, the system p40q is solvable with z " 1. Then z 2 " 1, when x " y. Case piiq. Given any px, yq P r0, 1s 2 , with x ă y, the system p40q is solvable if and only if 0 ď z ď x y . Then z 2 " x y , when x ă y. Case piiiq. Given any px, yq P r0, 1s 2 , with x ą y, the system p40q is solvable if and only if 0 ď z ď 1´x 1´y . Then z 2 " 1´x 1´y , when x ą y.
As shown by Theorem 13, the inference AC is not p-valid. Indeed, the assessment p1, 1, zq on tC, C|A, Au is coherent for every z P r0, 1s. In [42] it has been shown that PpCq " 1, PpC|Aq " 1, PpC| s Aq ă 1 ùñ PpAq " 1.
Thus, under the probabilistic constraint PpC| s Aq ă 1, we obtain a (weak) p-valid AC rule.
Further generalized iterated conditionals
In this section we will examine some further cases, in the Sue example, where the degree of belief in A increases if we consider suitable antecedents in the generalized iterated conditionals.
Analysis of A|ppC|Aq^Kq
We consider the case where the latent information is represented by the event K " Sue increases her study time. As it seems reasonable, we assume that the following inequalities hold:
piq PpA|Kq ě PpAq; piiq PpC|AKq ě PpC|Aq; piiiq PrpC|Aq^Ks ą 0.
Then, in order to take into account the latent information K, we study the generalized iterated conditional A|ppC|Aq^Kqq. From Definition 3 it holds that A^pC|Aq " AC and hence
A^pC|Aq^K " ACK.
We observe that pC|Aq^K^A is equal to pC|Aq^K, or 0, according to whether A is true, or false. Likewise, pC|Aq^K^s A is equal to pC|Aq^K, or 0, according to whether s A is true, or false. Therefore pC|Aq^K " pC|Aq^K^A`pC|Aq^K^s A and hence, from (42) pC|Aq^K " ACK`pC|Aq^K^s A.
In addition, PrpC|Aq| s AKs " PpC|Aq because A and s AK are incompatible (see [87, formula (24) ]) and from (14) it follows that
We observe that PrpC|Aq^Ks ą 0 implies PpKq ą 0 and PpC|Aq ą 0. Then, from (14), (42), 
In summary, if the latent information is represented by the event K and we assume the inequalities in (41) , then the degree of belief in A increases, that is PrA|ppC|Aq^Kqs ě PpAq.
Remark 15. If we consider the event H=Harry sees Sue buying some skiing equipment, then (likewise (41)) it is reasonable to evaluate PpA|Hq ě PpAq, PpC|AHq ě PpC|Aq, and PrpC|AqĤ s ą 0. Then, by the same reasoning, we reach the conclusion that PrA|ppC|Aq^Hqs ě PpAq.
Analysis of the new object A|rpC|Aq^pK|pC|Aqqs
It could seem that the reasoning in Section 7.1 should be developed by replacing in A|rpC|AqK s the event K by the iterated conditional K|pC|Aq, which formalizes the sentence if Sue goes to holiday when she passes the exam, then she increases her study time. If we replace K by K|pC|Aq, the iterated conditional A|rpC|Aq^Ks becomes the new object A|rpC|Aq^pK|pC|Aqqs which we need to examine. We start our analysis by defining the conjunction between a conditional event and an iterated conditional.
Definition 7. Let a conditional event C|F and an iterated conditional pB|Kq|pA|Hq be given, with PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs " ν. We define pC|Fq^rpB|Kq|pA|Hqs " rpB|Kq|pA|Hqs^pC|Fq " pA|Hq^pB|Kq^pC|Fq`ν rp s A|Hq^pC|Fqs.
We observe that, as pB|Kq|pA|Hq " pA|Hq^pB|Kq`ν s A|H, formula (47) implicitly assumes a suitable distributive property. Indeed
pC|Fq^rpB|Kq|pA|Hqs " pC|Fq^rpA|Hq^pB|Kq`ν s
A|Hs " " pA|Hq^pB|Kq^pC|Fq`ν rp s A|Hq^pC|Fqs, and as we can see the equality pC|Fq^rpA|Hq^pB|Kq`ν s A|Hs " pA|Hq^pB|Kq^pC|Fq`ν rp s A|Hq^pC|Fqs (48) represents a kind of distributive property of the conjunction over the sum. This property has been already introduced in [52] .
Remark 16. Notice that, by applying Definition 7 with C|F " A|H, as p s A|Hq^pA|Hq " 0 it follows that rpB|Kq|pA|Hqs^pA|Hq " pA|Hq^pB|Kq,
which has the same structure of the equality pB|Aq^A " AB. Moreover, by recalling (9), it holds that PrppB|Kq|pA|Hqq^pA|Hqs " PrpB|Kq|pA|HqsPpA|Hq.
Concerning the antecedent pC|Aq^pK|pC|Aqq of the new object studied in this section, A|rpC|Aq^pK|pC|Aqqs, as K|Ω " K from (49) it follows that pC|Aq^rK|pC|Aqs " pC|Aq^rpK|Ωq|pC|Aqs " pC|Aq^K.
Thus A|rpC|Aq^pK|pC|Aqqs " A|rpC|Aq^Ks,
that is the new object A|rpC|Aq^pK|pC|Aqqs coincides with the generalized iterated conditional A|rpC|Aq^Ks. Finally, for the degree of belief in A|rpC|Aq^pK|pC|Aqqs we reach the same conclusions given for A|rpC|Aq^Ks in Section 7.1.
The generalized iterated conditional A|ppC|Aq^pA|Hqq
In this section we consider the generalized iterated conditional where in the antecedent we add the conditional A|H. Here, H is a further event. Of course, when H " Ω it holds that A|ppC|Aq^pA|Hqq " A|ppC|Aq^Aq " A|AC " 1 ě A.
Hence, PrA|ppC|Aq^Aqs " 1 ě PpAq. We show below that, given any event H ‰ Ω, we obtain the weaker result that PrA|ppC|Aq^pA|Hqqs " PpA _ Hq ě PpAq.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examined Lewis's triviality proof, for what it could tell us about conditionals and iterations of them, and we studied the prevision of several iterated conditionals in the framework of coherence and conditional random quantities. We analyzed the antecedent-nested conditional D|pC|Aq and its negation s D|pC|Aq, by verifying that the import-export principle does not hold. In particular, we showed that PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq and Pr s A|pC|Aqs " Pp s Aq, when PpC|Aq ą 0. We also proved the ordering A|AC ď A|pC|Aq ď A|pAC _ s Aq. Then, we examined the Sue example where the equality PrA|pC|Aqs " PpAq appears counterintuitive. To support the intuition that the degree of belief in A should increase, we introduced and studied the following (generalized) iterated conditionals: A|ppC|Aq^Cq, A|ppC|Aq^Kq, A|ppC|Aq^pK|pC|Aqqq, and A|ppC|Aq^pA|Hqq. In these (generalized) iterated conditionals the respective antecedents are strengthened by additional information. This additional information can be seen as explicated latent information, which may derive from background knowledge or from conversational implicatures. We verified that for all these iterated conditionals, with suitably "strengthened" antecedents, the prevision is greater than or equal to the probability of the consequent A. Thus these iterated conditionals seem valid formalizations of different types of additional information in the antecedent, for which it holds that the degree of belief in A increases.
Our examination of the Sue example illustrates for us a general point about the analysis of intuitions in philosophical thought experiments. If our intuitions are in conflict with the results of the available formal methods, it could be that piq the analysis requires a richer formal structure, or piiq implicit information in the thought experiment has to be made explicit for a correct analysis. The formal understanding of the Sue example requires both, a richer formal structure and the explication of implicit information.
We also deepened the study of the probabilistic propagation from the premises to the conclusion for the Affirmation of the Consequent, which is an abductive inference form. Finally, we considered the equalities PrpC|Aq^As " PpC|AqPpAq and PrpA|Hq^pB|Kqs " PpA|HqPpB|Kq when HK " H. Some authors see these equalities as cases of probabilistic independence, but we argued that such equalities are correctly interpreted (only) as instances of uncorrelation between two random quantities.
Lewis ([65] ) was aware that, to retain the attractive qualities of the CPH and yet to avoid triviality, an approach something like ours would have to be developed. But he did not want himself to go down this line, because it would mean ". . . too much of a fresh start . . ." and would burden ". . . us with too much work to be done . . .". He specifically pointed to compounds and iterations of conditionals as serious problems for this fresh work. But we have done that work in this paper, proving that our approach implies the CPH as a natural consequence, avoids triviality, and leads to an account of compounds and iterations of conditionals.
